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by Mark J Loewenstein
Corporate directors' fiduciary du-
ties include duties of care and
loyalty. The duty of care is two-
fold, as directors must exercise
care in both overseeing the corporation's
business as well as in making specific
business decisions. While the duty of over-
sight has received less attention than the
duty of care in making business decisions,'
a recent Delaware case has made the du-
ty of oversight a timely topic of considera-
tion.
This article discusses two leading Del-
aware cases and other authorities on the
duty of oversight. It also reviews Colora-
do case law.
The Duty of Oversight
From Graham to Caremark
Since 1963, the leading Delaware Su-
preme Court case on the duty of oversight
has been Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co.2 Graham was a shareholder's deriva-
tive action based on antitrust violations
by lower-level managers' price fixing. This
antitrust violation took place without the
knowledge or acquiescence of the Allis-
Chalmers' directors or senior officers. How-
ever, the plaintiff's derivative action the-
orized that if the board had exercised a
proper level of supervision, it would have
discovered this unlawful conduct before it
harmed the corporation.
The plaintiffs theory of the case did not
persuade the Delaware Supreme Court,
which affirmed the Vice Chancellor's dis-
missal of the action against the director-
defendants. The court rejected the argu-
ment that directors had an obligation to
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implement a"system ofwatchfulness" with
this observation:
[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the
honesty and integrity of their subordi-
nates until something occurs to put
them on suspicion that something is
wrong. If such occurs and goes unheed-
ed, then liability of the directors might
well follow, but absent cause for suspi-
cion there is no duty upon the directors
to install and operate a corporate sys-
tem of espionage to ferret out wrongdo-
ing which they have no reason to sus-
pect exists.
3
Commentators have characterized the Del-
aware court's pronouncement in Graham
as a "red flag" test--unless the directors
see one they can assume that all is well.
The comforting "red flag" test, however,
may no longer be a reliable standard of
law. In the thirty-five years since Graham
was decided, several developments have
undermined the precedent, indicating that
directors must be more proactive in dis-
charging their duty of oversight. These
developments were highlighted in In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation,4 an opinion written by Chan-
cellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery. While a Chancery opinion is typical-
ly of lesser precedential value than a Su-
preme Court opinion, the age of the Gra-
ham decision, Chancellor Allen's promi-
nence, and the force of his opinion all sug-
gest otherwise.
Like Graham, Caremark was a deriva-
tive action that followed disclosure of cor-
porate misconduct. In the case of Care-
mark, the disclosures revealed that the
company had violated the federal Anti-
Referral Payments Law, which prohibits
health care providers from paying kick-
backs to physicians and others for refer-
ring Medicare and Medicaid patients.
Caremark had violated this law, and it
cost the company $250,000,000 to settle
criminal and civil suits. The shareholders
sued the directors on a negligence theory
to recover the corporate losses.
The suit was settled, and Chancellor
Allen had before him the parties' settle-
ment agreement for his approval. Under
the settlement, Caremark agreed to amend
its bylaws to add committees and proce-
dures designed to avoid a repeat of the con-
duct that resulted in the violations. Chan-
cellor Allen found the settlement fair to
the shareholders and agreed to the dis-
missal. However, he also used the oppor-
tunity to define the directors' duty of over-
sight, which duty was the basis ofthe plain-
tiffs complaint.
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen opined
that the Delaware Supreme Court, if faced
with the issue, would no longer endorse
the red flag test.5 Rather, the opinion ob-
served, in the years since the Supreme
Court decided Graham, it had recognized
the increased importance of the board of
directors. Citing Smith v. Van Gorkom6
and Paramount v. QVC,7 the opinion said
that Delaware's jurisprudence makes clear
the "seriousness with which the corpora-
tion law views the role of the corporate
board."'
The opinion in Caremark noted two oth-
er factors that weaken the Graham prec-
edent. First, under the Delaware corpo-
rate code, as in the Colorado Business
Corporation Act, the directors are charged
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with the obligation of monitoring the cor-
porate business,9 and this obligation re-
quires "relevant and timely information 10
Second, the federal sentencing guidelines
have enhanced penalties for corporate vi-
olators and provided opportunities for re-
duced sanctions if certain oversight mech-
anisms are in place. Both of these factors
suggest a proactive role for the board.
Thus, the opinion concluded, if a corpora-
tion violates the law, the directors may be
found responsible, even absent knowl-
edge or grounds for suspicion. According
to Caremark, this would be true unless the
board can demonstrate that "information
and reporting systems exist that are rea-
sonably designed to provide the board with
timely, accurate information sufficient to
allow management and the board, each
within its scope, to reach informed judg-
ments concerning both the corporation's
compliance with law and business per-
formance."
11
With this principle in mind, the opin-
ion then considered the plaintiffs burden
when alleging a lack of oversight. Plain-
tiffs must show that the directors demon-
strated a "sustained or systematic fail-
ure" to exercise oversight, 12 through, for
instance, "an utter failure [on the board's
part] to attempt to assure that a reason-




Caremark is not the sole source that sug-
gests a heightened duty of oversight for
corporate directors. The ABA Corporate
Directors Guidebook, the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, and the Business
Roundtable's "Statement of Position on
the Role of Corporate Governance and
American Competitiveness" all suggest
that directors must be proactive in assur-
ing that their company is in compliance
with the law. For instance, the Guidebook
provides:
A director should be satisfied that an
effective system is in place for periodic
and timely reporting to the board on ...
compliance with law and corporate
policies .... 14




Colorado courts have not directly decid-
ed any oversight cases raising the kinds
of issues present in Graham and Care-
mark, and what scant Colorado precedent
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that does exist is somewhat difficult to
characterize. The "leading" Colorado case
on director responsibility, Holland v. Amer-
ican Founders Life Insurance Co., 5 illus-
trates this uncertainty.
"Caremark suggests that
directors must act to
assure that corporate
policies are being faithfully
discharged and that the
corporation is complying
with the law."
Holland involved a suit by a corpora-
tion against one of its directors in which
the corporation alleged a breach of fidu-
ciary duty. As there was no question of
loyalty involved, the alleged breach relat-
ed to the duty of care. The director in ques-
tion, Holland, apparently was an unwit-
ting participant to a scheme devised by
Hudson, a fellow director and the presi-
dent ofAmerican Founders Hudson agreed
to issue American Founders stock to sev-
eral people in exchange for shares of an-
other corporation, Texas Adams. The Amer-
ican Founders stock was issued to the sub-
scribers without the approval of the Amer-
ican Founders board. Unfortunately, the
Texas Adams' shares received in the ex-
change were apparently worthless. Hol-
land's role, however, was apparently lim-
ited to signing the American Founders'
certificate as secretary of the corporation.
The trial court found Holland liable, but
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "a director and officer of a
business corporation is liable for his own
misconduct and not for the wrongful con-
duct of other directors or officers unless
he joined with them in perpetrating the
wrong." 6 Read broadly, this statement
suggests that the Colorado court would
not follow the Caremark precedent, be-
cause Caremark holds that under certain
circumstances a director may be liable for
the misconduct of others, even if the di-
rector did not know of the wrongdoing.
The defendant-director in Holland must
have known that the stock issuance was
unauthorized by the board and therefore
improper, if not illegal.
Two points about Holland are worth
noting. First, the defendant Holland was
not accused of failing to discharge his
fiduciary duty of oversight as a director of
American Founders. The claim appears to
be that he should not have signed the stock
certificates as secretary of the company
without board authorization. In this re-
gard, it is important to note that suit was
brought against only Holland and Hud-
son. If the claim were one of failure of over-
sight, the remaining six directors would
probably have been named as defendants
as well. Second, Holland was decided three
years before Graham, so even if Holland
were characterized as an oversight case,
the continued validity of the holding must
be questioned in light of the factors cited
in Caremark.
The Christy Case
Another case construing Colorado law,
Christy v. Cambron,17 was decided by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like the
Holland decision, which it cites, Christy
fails to shed much light on the oversight
obligation. Christy involved, among other
things, a claim by a group of investors that
their business failed due to the poor man-
agement of the defendant. The report of
the case states that the defendant was
charged with breaching "his fiduciary du-
ties as an incorporator under Colorado
law."' 8 Clearly, though, the defendant's
role was greater than that of a mere in-
corporator, as he established the business
as well as incorporated it. The jury award-
ed damages to the plaintiffs, but the trial
court granted the defendant's motion for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
As to the plaintiffs claim against the
defendant for breach of fiduciary duty, the
appellate court simply cited Holland to
the effect that directors (and, the court
added, promoters) are liable only for loss-
es "caused by their bad faith or willful and
intentional departure from duty, their
fraudulent breaches of trust, their gross
or willful negligence, or their ultra vires
acts."19 The court did not explain the ap-
plication of this principle to the facts of
the case, thus implying that the defen-
dant's conduct must not have been egre-
gious. Christy may be characterized as a
decision-making case rather than an over-
sight case, as the defendant was not
charged with failing to discover wrongdo-
ing by others.
Financial Institutions
The Holland court made a point of dis-
tinguishing business corporations from
banks: "The directors of a business corpo-
ration other than a bank are not held re-
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sponsible for mere errors of judgment or
for want of prudence short of clear and
gross negligence."2° The clear implication
of this statement is that directors of a bank
(or, presumably, a similar financial insti-
tution) are liable for mere negligence. The
leading case on the liability of directors of
a Colorado financial institution appears
to be Resolution Thust Corp. v. Heisernan,21
a decision by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado.
Heiserman involved, among other
things, a claim by the RTC that the direc-
tors of Capitol Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Denver were negligent. The
report of the case did not point to a single
decision or series of decisions that the di-
rectors made in a negligent fashion. Had
it done so, the case might be character-
ized as a challenge to the process that the
directors used in making decisions, a clas-
sic duty of care claim. Instead, the claim
seems to be broader-that the directors
somehow breached their duty to properly
oversee the activities of the institution. As
to this claim, the court held that directors
were liable for their mere negligence.
The District Court justified this deci-
sion primarily on the basis of the Colora-
do Corporate Code, which applied to this
financial institution and provided in per-
tinent part that:
A director shall perform his duties as a
director ... in good faith, in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with
such care as an ordinarily prudent per-
son in a like position would use in simi-
lar circumstances.
This language, the court concluded, is lan-
guage of common law negligence.
This statutory section, however, does
not distinguish between the directors of a
business corporation and a financial in-
stitution, and Holland had already held
that directors are not liable for their mere
negligence. The District Court recognized
this problem and had basically two an-
swers: first, the Colorado Supreme Court
(in Holland) had indicated that bank di-
rectors are held to a higher standard; and
second, the District Court was only decid-
ing the standard of care for directors of a
financial institution, period.'
The Heiserman case is not helpful prec-
edence on the oversight duty, in financial
institutions or business corporations. Con-
cepts of negligence do not translate very
well when considering the oversight func-
tion. The Heiserman court, unlike the Care-
mark court, gives no hint as to what a di-
rector must do to discharge his or her du-
ty of oversight, so it is impossible to say
what constitutes a negligent breach of that
duty. If Caremark is an accurate state-
ment of the law, directors are responsible
for implementing compliance law and pol-
icy systems for officers and employees. If
those systems fail, the directors have done
their part and bear no responsibility for
the resulting losses.24 Is the situation dif-
ferent for banks-that is, are bank direc-
tors liable even it acting in good faith and
in a manner they reasonably believe to be
in the best interests of the corporation,
the system they devise fails? Heiserman
does not resolve this question.
Alternatively, Heiserman might be char-
acterized as a case in which the directors
failed in their decision-making by, for in-
stance, exercising bad judgment in ap-
proving certain loans. Here, too, the lan-
guage of negligence does not serve well, be-
cause the only rational way to judge the di-
rectors' decision-making is to reference the
process they employed. The appropriate
questions to ask are whether the directors
exercised care in informing themselves
prior to making the decision, whether they
acted in good faith, and whether they act-
ed in a manner that they believed was in
the best interests of the corporation. That
series of questions cannot be simply char-
acterized as a single question of whether
the directors acted negligently.
Conclusion
To discharge their duty of oversight, di-
rectors cannot sit back and assume that
all is well. The Caremark case from Dela-
ware, as well as other authorities, sug-
gests that directors must act to assure
that corporate policies are being faithful-
ly discharged and that the corporation is
complying with the law. Colorado law is
less than clear on this subject. What prec-
edent that does exist might be read oth-
erwise, but such a reading may be incor-
rect. A recent federal district court case,
involving a failed savings and loan, sug-
gests that directors of a financial institu-
tion have a higher duty of oversight. In
any event, until the Colorado Supreme
Court rules on the question, some doubt
will remain. The prudent course, howev-
er, would follow the guidance provided by
the Caremark case.
NOTES
1. See, ag., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985), a leading Delaware case on
the duty of care in making business judg-
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mentary. For a particularly thoughtful article,
see Eisenberg, 'The Director's Duty of Care in
Negotiated Dispositions," 51 U Miami L. Rev.
579(1997).
2. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
3. Id. at 130.
4.698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
5. Id. at 970.
6.488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
7.637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
8. Caremark, supra, note 4 at 970.
9. CRS § 7-108-101(2).




14. "Corporate Director's Guidebook-1994
Edition," 49 Bus. Lawyer 1247, 1250 (1994).
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15.376 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1962).
16. Id. at 166.
17. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
18. Id. at 670.
19. Id. at 672, quoting from Holland, supra,
note 15 at 165.
20. Id. [Emphasis added.]
21.839 F.Supp. 1457 (D.Colo. 1993).
22. CRS § 7-5-101(2). The corporate code has
since been amended and recodified. The new
section, which is substantially the same as the
provision cited by the court, is found at § 7-
108-401.
23. Heiserman, supra, note 21 at 1464.
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Criminal Defense Bar Names Olom Award Recipient
The Colorado Criminal Defense Bar ("CCDB") recently named Boulder at-
torney Michael Enwall as the recipient of the 1998 Jonathan Olom Award.
He will be honored at dinner on May 9 at the Adam's Mark Hotel in Denver.
The Olom Award, the CCDB's highest honor, recognizes an attorney each year
for "outstanding service on behalf of the accused without regard for personal
gain." Tickets for the Olom Dinner are available through the CCDB by calling
(303) 758-2454 in Denver.
